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I find that the Eurosystem can stimulate the economy beyond the policy rate by increasing the 
size of its balance sheet or the monetary base, that is so-called  quantitative easing. The 
transmission mechanism turns out to be different compared  to traditional interest rate 
innovations: (i) whilst the effects on economic activity and consumer prices reach a peak after 
about one year for an interest rate innovation, this is more than six months later for a shift in 
the monetary base that is orthogonal to the policy rate (ii) interest rate spreads charged by 
banks decline persistently after  quantitative easing policies, whereas the spreads increase 
significantly after a fall in the policy rate (iii) there is no significant short-run liquidity effect 
after an interest rate innovation, that is additional bank loans are generated by a greater credit 
multiplier.  In contrast, the multiplier declines considerably after an expansion of the 
Eurosystem’s balance sheet. 
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Monetary authorities throughout the world have been responding to the global ﬁnancial
crisis by cutting interest rates to historically low levels and by embarking on a series of
unconventional policy actions such as operations that change the composition of their bal-
ance sheets, measures that expand the size of the balance sheet or actions that try to guide
longer term interest rate expectations. An extensive literature has already investigated
the impact of traditional interest rate movements on real activity and inﬂation.1 However,
little is known about the macroeconomic eﬀects and pass-through of non-standard policies
and how they diﬀer from conventional interest rate changes.2 A better understanding
of the transmission mechanism and impact on economic activity is not only essential for
policymakers, it is also important to construct theoretical monetary models.
I attempt to address this issue for the Euro area. Notice that the ECB’s policy re-
sponses to the turmoil were not fully "unconventional" in their essence (Borio and Disyatat
2009). In particular, most policy actions of the ECB in the aftermath of the crisis were
aimed at expanding the size of the central bank balance sheet or inﬂuencing longer term
money market and bank lending interest rates. For instance, there has been a shift from
a variable rate tender to a ﬁxed rate tender with full allotment, the pool of collateral
accepted for reﬁnancing operations has been enlarged and liquidity to banks has been
provided at longer maturities. However, also in normal times, the ECB should have in-
ﬂuenced interest rates in credit and money markets without altering its main policy rate
(e.g. by changing the signals in its communications). The composition of the balance
sheet, in particular the ratio between the volumes of main reﬁnancing operations (MROs)
and longer-term reﬁnancing operations (LTOs), has also not been constant over time. In
addition, the usual management of liquidity by the Eurosystem should inherently also
have resulted in shocks to liquidity oﬀered to banks beyond the overnight interest rate
(e.g. changes in the allocated volume of liquidity and errors in the estimation of so-called
autonomous liquidity needs).
In this study, the fact that the ECB mainly acted via its regular channels is used to
learn more about the (potential) eﬀectiveness of the extraordinary policy measures. More
1For instance Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) for the
United States or Peersman and Smets (2003) for the Euro area
2A number of studies have examined the eﬀects of a set of liquidity measures on money market interest
rate spreads in the aftermath of the crisis, but not the ultimate impact on the real economy (e.g. Wu
2008; Taylor and Williams 2009; Christensen, Lopez and Rudebusch 2009). An exception is a recent study
by Lenza, Pill and Reichlin (2010), who evaluate the macroeconomic consequences of non-standard policy
measures in the US, Japan and Euro area by conducting counterfactual exercises based on assumptions
regarding how interest rate spreads would have evolved with and without the measures.
2precisely, I estimate a structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) model for the Euro area
economy with monthly data over the sample period 1999M1-2009M12. SVARs impose
very little theoretical structure on the data and can be used to establish some relevant
stylized facts. Within this SVAR, I identify three possible sources of disturbances at the
supply side of the credit market: (i) innovations to credit supply that are independent
of a policy action, labeled as credit multiplier shocks, (ii) credit supply shocks resulting
from a shift in the monetary policy rate, and (iii) innovations to credit supply caused by
monetary policy actions that are orthogonal to the policy rate. The latter disturbances
are labeled as "unconventional" or "non-standard" monetary policy shocks. An inspection
of the impulse response functions and time series of the shocks should help to interpret
the exact source more carefully and reveal whether the measures taken in the aftermath
of the crisis are captured by the estimated innovations, that is a reverse engineering of
the underlying impulse. The estimated dynamic eﬀects of these shocks could then be used
as a benchmark to learn more about the eﬀectiveness and pass-through of unconventional
policies to economic activity and inﬂation.
Some caution when interpreting the results is obviously required. In the analysis, the
eﬀects of a generic series of monetary policy innovations that are orthogonal to the policy
rate are estimated. These shocks are a mixture of diﬀerent actions of which the eﬀects
are not necessarily the same. It is also not clear whether the dynamic eﬀects of shocks in
normal times are similar as in a crisis period. Nevertheless, it should be useful as a starting
point. Furthermore, it is important to stress that I focus on the eﬀects via credit supply or
the banking sector, that is the framework does not capture policy interventions that do not
aﬀect bank lending directly or indirectly.3 The Euro area is hence particularly interesting.
In contrast to economies where securities markets play a crucial role in the funding of the
private sector, borrowing and lending in the Euro area predominantly take place through
the intermediation of the banking sector.4 The non-standard policy measures taken by the
Eurosystem as a response to the crisis were also primarily aimed at fueling the banking
system. Even the limited outright purchases of covered bonds were intended to improve
bank funding conditions (Lenza, Pill and Reichlin 2010).5
I ﬁnd that the identiﬁed unconventional monetary policy shocks are characterized by
as i g n i ﬁcant shift in the monetary base or the balance sheet size of the Eurosystem, which
3This focus is diﬀerent from e.g. Gertler and Karadi (2009), who deﬁne unconventional monetary policy
as "direct lending by the central bank in private markets", which is more applicable to the United States.
See also Borio and Disyatat (2009) for a classiﬁcation of unconventional monetary policies.
4Bank loans have in recent years accounted for around 85 percent of the total external ﬁnancing of the
private sector in the euro area (ECB 2008).
5Another advantage is that the policy rate did not hit the zero lower bound in the Euro area.
3corresponds to so-called quantitative easing policies, and have a signiﬁcant impact on eco-
nomic activity and inﬂation. The time series of the shocks capture very well the measures
taken in the aftermath of the crisis. However, also before the crisis, there were signiﬁcant
non-standard monetary policy disturbances, in particular around the 2001 slowdown and
the cash changeover in 2002. The results are qualitatively even robust for a sample period
which is limited to the pre-crisis period.
When I compare the eﬀects with traditional interest rate innovations, I ﬁnd similar
macroeconomic consequences. Speciﬁcally, both shocks have a hump-shaped impact on
economic activity and result in a permanent higher level of consumer prices. Hence, both
types of instruments can be used for policy purposes. The magnitude of the impact on
economic activity is, for instance, similar for a 25 basis points decline in the policy rate
or a 10 percent increase in the monetary base which is orthogonal to the policy rate.
The transmission mechanism, however, turns out to be diﬀerent for both instruments.
In particular, the eﬀects of balance sheet policies on output and inﬂation are more sluggish.
Whilst the eﬀects on economic activity and consumer prices reach a peak after about one
year for interest rate innovations, this is more than six months later for innovations to
the monetary base. Furthermore, bank interest rate spreads increase signiﬁcantly after an
expansionary interest rate innovation, whereas spreads persistently decline after an action
which raises the size of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet. Finally, there is no signiﬁcant
short-run liquidity eﬀect after an interest rate shock, that is additional bank loans are
generated by a greater credit multiplier. In contrast, the multiplier declines signiﬁcantly
for a rise in bank lending which is caused by an expansion in the monetary base. Both
features are consistent with a possible stronger risk-taking channel following interest rate
shifts (Adrian and Shin 2010; Borio and Zhu 2008).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I discuss the bench-
mark VAR model, data and identiﬁcation strategy that will be used for the estimations.
The results are reported in section 3, as well as a number of sensitivity checks, a closer
inspection of the source of the identiﬁed unconventional shocks and the monetary trans-
mission mechanism. Finally, section 4 concludes.
42 B a s e l i n eV A Rm o d e lf o rt h eE u r oa r e ae c o n o m y
2.1 Benchmark speciﬁcation
The baseline VAR model that will be used for decomposing credit supply innovations into
mutually orthogonal components has the following representation:
Zt = α + A(L)Zt−1 + Bεt (1)
where Zt is a vector of endogenous variables containing the seasonally adjusted natural
logarithms of respectively output (yt), prices (pt), the volume of bank credit (ct), the mon-
etary base (bt), the level of the interest rate on credit (it), and the level of the monetary
policy rate (st). α is a vector of constants, A(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator
L,a n dB the contemporaneous impact matrix of the mutually uncorrelated disturbances
εt. The VARs in this study are estimated in (log) levels, which allows for implicit cointe-
grating relationships in the data (Sims, Stock and Watson 1990). A more explicit analysis
of the long-run behavior of the various variables is limited by the relatively short sample
available.
All data are monthly and obtained from the ECB Statistical Data Warehouse. I proxy
output by industrial production and prices by the HICP. Given the prominent role of bank
l o a n sa sas o u r c eo fe x t e r n a lﬁnance in the Euro area and the fact that the Eurosystem
primarily implemented its non-standard policy actions via the banking system, the bench-
mark VAR also contains bank credit and the corresponding interest rate. I measure bank
credit by the volume of MFI loans to the private sector adjusted for sales and securiti-
zation. In particular, this index takes into account the fact that securitization activities
could drive a wedge between actual lending and that derived from MFI balance sheet sta-
tistics. Similarly, the index corrects for the re-intermediation of loans onto MFI balance
sheets without a corresponding rise in actual lending. The latter was for instance the case
when markets for several asset-backed securities became illiquid during the ﬁnancial cri-
sis. For the interest rate on bank lending, I use the constructed composite lending rate of
Peersman (2011), which is a weighted average of interest rates charged by MFI’s on loans
to households, non-ﬁnancial corporations and non-MFI ﬁnancial intermediaries (insurance
corporations, pension funds and other non-MFI ﬁnancial intermediaries including invest-
ment funds). Furthermore, the policy rate in the VAR is the minimum bid rate of variable
rate tenders or the rate applied to ﬁx e dr a t et e n d e r si nt h em a i nr e ﬁnancing operations
(MROs) of the Eurosystem, and the monetary base is deﬁned as the sum of banknotes in
5circulation and bank reserves (credit institutions current accounts and deposit facility).
In section 3.2, I will examine the robustness of the results for alternative speciﬁcations of
the VAR, as well as alternative variables.
2.2 Identiﬁcation strategy
In order to identify the structural innovations, I focus on bank lending activities. Whereas
this focus makes it easier to disentangle the shocks, a caveat is that conventional and
unconventional monetary policy innovations that aﬀect the economy beyond bank lending
are not captured. However, borrowing and lending in the Euro area predominantly take
place through the intermediation of the banking sector, and non-standard measures taken
by the Eurosystem as a response to the crisis were primarily aimed at fueling the banking
system. Hence, most monetary policy actions should be captured in the analysis.
Within the VAR model, I identify three possible sources of disturbances at the supply
side of the credit market. In particular, credit supply in the Euro area is determined by
the Eurosystem and ﬁnancial intermediaries. On the one hand, credit supply disturbances
could hence be the result of shifts in the volume of credit supplied by banks independently
of a policy action. I label these shocks as innovations to the credit multiplier, which
captures the volume of bank loans that is generated by the ﬁnancial sector with a speciﬁc
amount of central bank money. On the other hand, innovations to the supply of credit
could be the consequence of monetary policy decisions. I distinguish between two types of
such decisions, that is alterations to the policy rate and all other possible monetary policy
actions that inﬂuence the supply of bank loans.
T h eb a s e l i n es e to fr e s t r i c t i o n st oi d e n t i f yt h es h o c k sa r eam i x t u r eo fz e r oa n ds i g n
restrictions on the contemporaneous impact matrix B of equation (1). More speciﬁcally,
I use the following set of restrictions:6
Identiﬁcation of diﬀerent sources of innovations to credit supply
yt pt ct it st bt ct − bt
Credit multiplier shocks 00↑lagged ↓↑ ↑
Interest rate innovations 00↑lagged ↓↓
Non-standard policy actions 00↑lagged ↓ 0
Note: yt = output, pt = prices, ct =c r e d i t ,it = lending rate, st = policy rate, bt = monetary base
6Note that the sign restrictions are implemented as > or 6, which implies that a zero impact is also
possible. Notice also that, for technical reasons, the zero restriction on the policy rate is implemented as
a near-zero restriction. In particular, the immediate impact should be below a threshold of 1 basis point.
6First, in line with the traditional literature on the eﬀects of nominal shocks, I assume
that there is only a lagged impact of credit supply disturbances on output and consumer
prices, that is the contemporaneous impact on both variables is restricted to be zero. In
contrast, innovations to output and prices are allowed to have an immediate impact on the
volume of credit, the monetary base, the lending rate and the policy rate. This assumption
should distinguish shocks that are speciﬁc to the credit market from disturbances in the
real economy that could also inﬂuence the credit market. Despite being a conservative
assumption, restraining the contemporaneous impact of nominal disturbances on real vari-
ables is considered as being plausible for monthly estimations and allows for comparability
with previous results.7 In section 3.2, I also discuss a robustness check with an identi-
ﬁcation strategy that does allow for feedback of credit supply disturbances to economic
activity and consumer prices within the period, but it turns out that the results are not
very sensitive to this assumption.
Second, to diﬀerentiate from exogenous credit demand disturbances, I assume that
shocks at the supply side of the credit market lead to a negative (or non-positive) co-
movement between the interest rate and the volume of credit. In the empirical analysis,
the sign restrictions are imposed on the immediate impact and the following four months
after the shocks. An exception is the response of the volume of credit, for which the
restrictions are only imposed on the third and fourth lag after the disturbances to allow
for a possible short-run rise of bank lending after a rise in the lending rate. Giannone,
Lenza and Reichlin (2009) ﬁnd that an unexpected interest rate hike only aﬀects consumer
loans and loans for housing purposes negatively on impact, while the component loans to
non-ﬁnancial corporations responds negatively with a lag, but positively on impact (see
also Den Haan, Sumner and Yamashiro 2007). Firms could, for instance, still draw on
their credit lines at a prespeciﬁed rate when the interest rate on new loans increases. Also
this assumption does not seem to matter since the immediate response will always be in
line with the subsequent months for all three disturbances.
Credit multiplier shocks An innovation to credit supply could be the consequence of a
shift in the supply of loans by the banking sector. Consider for instance a shock that makes
it easier for ﬁnancial institutions to securitize their loans. This allows banks to increasingly
fund themselves by selling loans in the secondary market and boosts their ability to supply
7E.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Bernanke and Mihov (1995), Strongin (1995) amongst others make
the same assumption for the identiﬁcation of monetary policy and other nominal shocks in the US. Several
studies even make this assumption using quarterly data, e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999)
or Peersman and Smets (2003).
7new loans for a given amount of central bank money. Other examples of innovations that
inﬂuence the supply of credit independently of a monetary policy decision are shocks to
the risk appetite of banks or disturbances that aﬀect credit derivatives markets. All that is
required is that banks are somehow able to obtain extra funding in the market to ﬁnance
additional loans, which could be either deposits or other liabilities. By deﬁnition, such a
shock increases the credit multiplier. I further impose the restriction that the ECB reacts
to a positive innovation by tightening its policy stance. A policy tightening is consistent
with a central bank that tries to stabilize potential output and inﬂation consequences.
Traditional interest rate innovations Monetary policy disturbances are obviously
also expected to aﬀect the supply of credit. The ECB mainly conducts its policy by steering
the EONIA. The desired level is typically signalled to the ﬁnancial markets through either
the minimum bid rate of variable rate tenders or the rate applied to ﬁxed rate tenders in
its main reﬁnancing operations (MROs). Accordingly, a credit supply disturbance caused
by a traditional interest rate innovation is identiﬁed as a fall in the policy rate which is
passed on to bank lending rates, whilst increasing the volume of credit with a possible lag.
Non-standard policy actions The supply of credit could however also be inﬂuenced by
other policy actions, such as operations that change the composition of the central bank’s
balance sheet, actions that try to guide longer term interest rate expectations or measures
that expand or reduce the size of the balance sheet or monetary base. I label all policy
measures that aﬀect the supply of credit beyond the policy rate as "unconventional" or
"non-standard". By construction, these policies are orthogonal to interest rate innovations.
In particular, non-standard policy disturbances are identiﬁed as credit supply shocks with
a zero contemporaneous impact on the policy rate, which is suﬃcient to disentangle the
shocks from interest rate innovations, but also from shocks to the credit multiplier as
potential disturbances at the supply side of the credit market.8
Some remarks about the identiﬁed non-standard policy shocks are worth mentioning.
First, unconventional policy actions are only captured by this shock if they aﬀect the
supply of credit, that is if they inﬂuence the volume of credit and bank lending rates
(not necessarily economic activity, which will be determined by the data). In contrast,
measures that inﬂuence the economy beyond ﬁnancial intermediaries are not identiﬁed,
which could for instance be the case for outright purchases of government bonds. The
8Notice that there are four credit market variables in the VAR while only three credit market distur-
bances are identiﬁed, as well as two real economy shocks. Hence, all other shocks that inﬂuence credit
market variables are captured by the remaining innovation, which acts as a "sponge" shock.
8same is true for the identiﬁed interest rate innovations, for which the results could be
compared with other studies that identify monetary policy shocks in a more traditional
way. Second, these disturbances could be "demand-induced". In particular, an expansion
of credit supply could be driven by additional liquidity that ﬁnancial institutions obtain
from the central bank without augmenting the multiplier. The accommodation of this
demand is, however, a policy decision. More importantly, the identifying restrictions
require that the central bank does not react to the shock and its potential consequences
by keeping the policy rate constant, which is obviously also a policy decision. An example
is the surge of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet at a given policy rate as a consequence of
the full allotment decision in September 2008.
Accordingly, the identiﬁed non-standard policy shocks can be considered as a combi-
nation of several possible measures aimed at inﬂuencing ﬁnancing conditions and the ﬂow
of credit beyond the main policy rate. For instance, as a response to the ﬁnancial crisis,
there has been a shift from a variable rate tender to a ﬁxed rate tender with full allotment,
liquidity to banks has been provided at longer maturities and the ECB has expanded its
list of eligible collateral. To the extent that the outright purchases of covered bonds have
inﬂuenced credit conditions of the banking system, these actions should also be captured
by the innovations. However, monetary policy shocks that are orthogonal to the main
policy rate could also have occurred before the ﬁnancial crisis. In particular, a speciﬁc
level of the MRO rate may always be associated with varying monetary conditions. A
given policy rate may for instance be associated with a relatively ﬂat or steep term struc-
ture of interest rates, which could be inﬂuenced by the communication of future policy
intentions.9 Whenever the supply of credit is ultimately aﬀected, such actions are identi-
ﬁed as unconventional policy shocks in the estimations. Furthermore, the management of
liquidity by the ECB should inherently also have resulted in unconventional policy shocks
before the turmoil. More speciﬁcally, in its main and longer term reﬁnancing operations,
the ECB usually decided on the total amount of liquidity to be allotted. Hence, changes
in the allocated volume of liquidity and errors in the estimation of so-called autonomous
liquidity needs could have inﬂuenced the supply of lending. In particular, excess liquidity
allocated by the ECB is not necessarily oﬀered on the overnight interbanking market, it
9Remark that communication eﬀects are also an integral part of the transmission mechanism of the
non-standard policy measures that were taken following the default of Lehman Brothers. For instance, an
announcement that monetary authorities are prepared to engage in operations for certain assets may in
itself boost conﬁdence in those assets thereby reducing liquidity premia (Borio and Disyatat 2009). The
same argument holds for an announcement that the central bank is prepared to accommodate liquidity
shortages in the interbanking market. In this regard, the lengthening of reﬁn a n c i n go p e r a t i o n st oo n ey e a r
could also be interpreted as a signal of persistent low interest rates.
9could also ﬁnd its way to bank lending. Even the composition of the balance sheet has not
been constant over time, that is there have also been shifts in the volume of main reﬁnanc-
ing operations versus longer-term operations before the crisis. In the end, a generic series
of innovations to bank lending caused by monetary policy actions that are orthogonal to
t h ep o l i c yr a t ei si d e n t i ﬁed. The dynamic eﬀects of these innovations could be used as a
benchmark for the eﬀectiveness of extraordinary policies. Once the SVAR is estimated, a
closer look at the time series of the shocks should reveal whether the measures taken in
the aftermath of the crisis are captured by the innovations. In addition, an inspection of
the impulse response functions should help to interpret the source more carefully, i.e. a
reverse engineering of the underlying impulse.
3E s t i m a t i o n r e s u l t s
3.1 Baseline model
The benchmark VAR is estimated for the sample period 1999M9-2009M12. Based on
the usual lag-length selection criteria, the estimations include four lags of the endogenous
variables.10 I use a Bayesian approach for estimation and inference. For details, I refer
to Peersman (2005) or Uhlig (2005). The prior and posterior distributions of the reduced
form VAR belong to the Normal-Wishart family. To draw the ‘candidate truths’ from
the posterior, I take a joint draw from the unrestricted Normal-Wishart posterior for the
VAR parameters as well as a random possible decomposition B of the variance-covariance
matrix, which allows the construction of impulse response functions. If the impulse re-
sponse functions from a particular draw satisfy the imposed restrictions, the draw is kept.
Otherwise, the draw is rejected by giving it a zero prior weight. Each draw is required
to satisfy the restrictions of all three identiﬁed shocks simultaneously. Finally, a total of
1000 successful draws from the posterior are used to produce the ﬁgures.
3.1.1 Impulse response analysis
Panel A of Figure 1 displays the impulse response functions for interest rate innovations
and unconventional policy shocks. To improve comparability, the impulse responses for
both shocks are shown within the same panel. Speciﬁcally, the shaded (light blue) areas
represent the 68 percent posterior probability regions of the estimated responses to a one
10Most criteria even suggest a shorter lag length. The results are however robust for diﬀerent choices of
lag length.
10standard deviation innovation to the policy rate, whereas the dotted (red) lines those of
a non-standard monetary policy action. The impulse response patterns for credit supply
shocks caused by traditional interest rate innovations are broadly in line with the pre-EMU
VAR evidence on the monetary transmission mechanism (e.g. Peersman and Smets 2003),
and the existing evidence for the U.S. (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder 1992, Bernanke and
Mihov 1995, or Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans 1999). An unexpected fall in the policy
rate tends to be followed by a temporary rise in economic activity after a few months.
The eﬀect on output reaches a peak after one year and returns to the baseline afterwards.
On the other hand, consumer prices rise permanently. Interestingly, also unconventional
monetary policy shocks that aﬀect the supply of credit have signiﬁcant temporary output
eﬀects and a permanent impact on the level of consumer prices. The pass-through is,
however, more delayed. In particular, output and prices only start to rise signiﬁcantly
after about one year, and the peak eﬀect on economic activity is at least six months later
than for an interest rate shock.
It is striking how similar the ultimate eﬀects of non-standard policy actions are, despite
the lack of a short-run shift in the policy rate. A closer inspection of the monetary
base response function suggests that the identiﬁed non-standard shocks mainly represent
measures aimed at expanding or reducing the size of the central bank’s balance sheet,
which corresponds to so-called quantitative easing policies. In particular, a one-standard
deviation unconventional monetary policy shock is characterized by an increase in the
monetary base of approximately 2 percent. In sum, monetary policy can potentially
inﬂuence economic activity via the supply of bank loans beyond an interest rate shift, that
is more than one instrument can be used for policy purposes. The impact on economic
activity is for instance similar for a 25 basis po i n t sd e c l i n ei nt h ep o l i c yr a t ea n da ni n c r e a s e
in the monetary base of 10 percent at a given level of the policy rate.11
As shown in panel B of Figure 1, also credit multiplier shocks have a hump-shaped
output pattern whilst prices rise persistently. A detailed analysis of these disturbances is
out of the scope of this paper.12 Noticeable, however, is the estimated negative endoge-
nous response of the monetary base to a positive credit multiplier shock, which suggests
that these disturbances are characterized by relatively easy alternative (non central bank)
11This ﬁnding is in line with Nelson (2002), who ﬁn d st h a tr e a lm o n e t a r yb a s eg r o w t hi sas i g n i ﬁcant
determinant for economic activity in the UK and US, controlling for the short-term real interest rate.
12An analysis of the sources of credit multiplier disturbances, as well as the macroeconomic relevance,
can be found in Peersman (2011). In that paper, I examine the consequences of diﬀerent types of credit
market disturbances with a structural interpretation, that is exogenous credit demand, monetary policy
and credit multiplier shocks. In contrast to the present study, I also identify exogenous credit demand
shocks, but not unconventional policy shocks.
11funding opportunities for banks. Hence, to the extent that the ﬁnancial crisis can be
considered as a huge negative credit multiplier shock, this response partly explains the
signiﬁcant rise of the monetary base in the aftermath of the crisis. In particular, when
bank’s funding conditions deteriorate, their capacity to issue loans relative to the amount
of liquidity provided by the central bank declines, making them more dependent on the
central bank for their liquidity needs.
3.1.2 Time series of shocks
To explore the pattern of the disturbances over time, Figure 2 shows the times series
of the shocks, as well as the evolution of the monetary base components and the policy
rate. More precisely, the light and dark grey areas in panel A show the evolution of
respectively the volume of currency in circulation and the volume of bank reserves since the
introduction of the euro. The full (blue) line in panel A represents the cumulative evolution
of the estimated unconventional monetary policy shocks (a rise implies an expansionary
shock). As can be seen, the extraordinary policy measures in response to the crisis are
clearly captured by the shocks. Shortly after the collapse of Lehmann, cumulative non-
standard monetary policy shocks increased by 8 standard deviations within a period of 8
months. The pattern is also very much in line with the evolution of bank reserves, and
to a lesser extent currency in circulation, during that period. However, also before the
crisis, there were signiﬁcant non-standard monetary policy shocks. Speciﬁcally, the Euro
area experienced a series of expansionary unconventional policy shocks between 2000 and
the second half of 2001, which includes the millennium bug and September 11, whereas
the stance was rather restrictive during the subsequent slowdown and at the time of the
cash changeover in 2002. Also this pattern is very much in line with the evolution of the
monetary base during that period, in particular the amount of currency in circulation.13
Interestingly, also the endogenous response of the monetary base to the ﬁnancial crisis
is captured by the SVAR. The dotted (red) line in panel A of Figure 2 represents the
cumulative evolution of negative innovations to the credit multiplier (a rise implies a fall
in the multiplier). The illiquidity of asset-backed securities markets and the deterioration
of risk proﬁles and capital positions of banks during the crisis are identiﬁed as a series of
negative shocks to the credit multiplier. As discussed in the impulse response analysis, a
deterioration of bank’s funding conditions make them more dependent on the central bank
for their liquidity needs, resulting in a rise of the monetary base. Accordingly, unfavorable
13See also Gaspar and Kashyap (2006) for a documentation of this turbulent episode in the ECB’s
liquidity management.
12credit multiplier shocks have clearly contributed to the (double spiked) expansion of the
monetary base at the end of the sample period.
On the other hand, the pattern of interest rate innovations is closely related to the
evolution of the policy rate over the sample period. Both series are shown in panel B of
Figure 2. The policy rate was restrictive around the 2001 slowdown, supportive between
2003 and 2006, and again restrictive between 2006 and the middle of 2007. Tight monetary
conditions in the course of 2008 are also identiﬁed as a series of restrictive interest rate
innovations.14 As expected, the stance of the policy rate was again expansionary after the
collapse of Lehmann, which is illustrated by a 4 standard deviations decline of cumulative
interest rate innovations.
3.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, I brieﬂy discuss the robustness of the results for alternative measures
of central bank money, a VAR with money market instead of credit market variables,
an alternative identiﬁcation strategy and a shorter sample period. Notice ﬁrst that the
results are robust when unemployment is used as an output measure or when core HICP
is used as a price measure. Extending the VAR with the European Sentiment Indicator,
oil prices or ﬁnancial market variables such as stock market volatility does also not aﬀect
the conclusions.
Central bank money measures Figure 3, rows 1-3 show the impulse responses for
some key variables after both monetary policy shocks when respectively the amount of
bank reserves, the volume of liquidity providing operations and the overall size of the
ECB’s balance sheet are used as a proxy for central bank money. As shown in Figure 2,
bank reserves ﬂuctuated relatively more than the currency component of the monetary
base after the collapse of Lehmann Brothers. On the other hand, there was a decline
of currency in circulation and the monetary base in the run-up to the cash turnover in
January 2002, which was not the case for the amount of bank reserves. As can be seen from
the impulse responses, the macroeconomic consequences of unconventional policy actions
that aﬀect the volume of bank reserves are very similar as in the baseline model with the
monetary base. Surprisingly, there is no liquidity eﬀect for an interest rate innovation,
that is bank reserves even decrease after a decline in the policy rate. In section 3.4, this
will be analyzed in more detail.
14Whereas the ﬁnancial turmoil started in the summer of 2007, the ECB kept the interest rate at 4
percent, and even raised the policy rate to 4.25 percent in July 2008.
13The volume of liquidity providing operations, obtained from the asset-side of the Eu-
rosystem’s balance sheet, should better capture policy decisions with respect to bank
liquidity provision. However, in contrast to the monetary base, this aggregate does not
capture changes of net assets in gold and foreign currency, which could also inﬂuence bank
lending. In addition, part of the liquidity providing operations return to the Eurosystem
in the form of central government deposits and other liquidity absorbing operations by
the ECB. The latter also inﬂuences the ability of bank lending and is taken into account
for the measurement of the monetary base. On the other hand, the overall size of the
balance sheet is the sum of liquidity providing operations and all other net assets (mainly
gold and foreign currency) on the balance of the Eurosystem. Figure 3 shows that the
eﬀects on economic activity and consumer prices are also similar for these two alternative
aggregates. In sum, the baseline ﬁndings do not depend on the selected measure of central
bank money.
AV A Rm o d e lw i t hm o n e y The fourth row of Figure 3 shows the eﬀects for a VAR
model with money market variables. More precisely, the VAR is now re-estimated with M3
instead of credit and the 3-month Euribor instead of the bank lending rate. The identiﬁed
unconventional monetary policy shocks are disturbances to the supply of money which
are not caused by innovations to the money multiplier whilst being orthogonal to shifts in
the policy rate. The results are again robust, that is non-standard policy measures still
have a signiﬁcant humped-shaped impact on output and a permanent eﬀect on the level
of consumer prices. In contrast to the VARs with credit market variables, the timing of
the output pattern is now the same for both types of policy instruments.
Alternative identiﬁcation strategy I nt h eb a s e l i n ei d e n t i ﬁcation strategy, I have
assumed that there is no eﬀect of credit market disturbances on output and consumer
prices within the month. To be less conservative, I have also re-estimated the VAR leaving
both variables unrestricted on impact. An implicit assumption is then that real economy
shocks all move the volume of credit and lending rates in the same direction or, in other
words, a disturbance that boosts economic activity shifts the demand curve for credit to
the right. Again, this does not aﬀect the conclusions of the paper. As shown in the ﬁfth
row of Figure 3, the contemporaneous output and inﬂationary eﬀects are insigniﬁcant,
while the patterns of the responses are comparable to the benchmark results after a few
months.
14A shorter sample period Stability tests suggest that the coeﬃcients of the VAR have
been rather stable over the sample period.15 Nevertheless, as a ﬁnal robustness check, I
have also estimated the baseline VAR over a sample period that excludes the enhanced
credit support period (until mid 2008). The impulse responses are shown in the bottom row
of Figure 3 and conﬁrm the conjecture that unconventional monetary policy shocks also
o c c u r r e di nn o r m a lt i m e sa n dh a ds i g n i ﬁcant macroeconomic consequences. Speciﬁcally,
the dynamic eﬀects of non-standard policy innovations before the crisis turn out to be
qualitatively similar as for the whole sample period. The size of a one standard deviation
shock is only smaller, and hence also the magnitude of the eﬀects. Somewhat surprising
are the much less precisely estimated eﬀects of traditional interest rate innovations over the
shorter sample period, suggesting that the policy response to the recession has improved
the identiﬁcation of conventional monetary policy shocks.
3.3 Inspecting the source of unconventional monetary policy shocks
The results have revealed that the identiﬁed non-standard monetary policy shocks are
characterized by a shift in the monetary base or the size of the Eurosystem’s balance sheet,
which corresponds to quantitative easing. Before turning to the transmission mechanism
in the next section, I now examine the underlying source of the shocks more carefully.
First, to be sure that the shocks are not capturing deviations between the EONIA and
the MRO rate, that is an unconventional policy shock would then just be another "interest
rate" innovation within the corridor of the standing facilities, I have re-estimated the VAR
with the EONIA as the policy rate instead of the MRO rate.16 The results are shown in
panel A of Figure 4. There is clearly an eﬀect beyond the overnight interest rate. Non-
standard policy actions are still characterized by a signiﬁcant rise in the monetary base
having a signiﬁcant impact on economic activity and consumer prices.
The dominance of innovations to central bank money as the underlying source of uncon-
ventional policy shocks is conﬁrmed by the responses of some other variables. Speciﬁcally,
I have also re-estimated the benchmark VAR by adding each time an additional variable
of interest to the block of credit market variables. The identifying restrictions are the
15For instance, equation by equation Quandt-Andrews tests for one or more unknown structural break-
points in the sample cannot reject the null hypothesis of no breakpoints. The cumulative sums of the
recursive residuals (CUSUM tests), also indicate that the parameters have been stable over the sample
period. Only Chow forecast tests for a speciﬁc break in the summer of 2008 do reject stability, in particular
for the policy rate and monetary base equations, which is the result of an increased size of the innovations.
16Notice that, as a consequences of several unconventional policies, the EONIA has been systematically
lower than the MRO rate after September 2008.
15same as in the benchmark model and the responses of the additional variables are not
restricted on impact. The results for each variable can be found in panel B of Figure 4.17
First, if the underlying source of the innovations would be a shift in expected monetary
policy, for instance due to changes in the communication of the ECB, the spread between
the 12-month and 1-month Euribor should decline signiﬁcantly on impact. Whereas the
m o n e ym a r k e tt e r ms p r e a dd o e ss l i g h t l yd e c line after one month, the contemporaneous
response turns out to be insigniﬁcant. This suggest that the fall in the spread is rather an
endogenous reaction to the shift in the balance sheet than the source of the unconventional
policy shock.
The source of the disturbances is also not a change in the composition of the central
bank balance sheet. As a response to the ﬁnancial crisis, the Eurosystem provided for
instance more liquidity to banks at longer maturities. However, as shown in Figure 4,
the response of the ratio between the volume of main reﬁnancing operations and long-
term operations does not change after a non-standard policy shock. Finally, the identiﬁed
innovations are not an endogenous reaction of central bank money to turbulence in the
money market, for instance increased liquidity demand by banks because of an illiquid
money market, which is not captured by credit multiplier innovations. In particular, the
spread between the 3-month Euribor and the Overnight Index Swap rate, which can be
considered as a proxy for ﬁnancial turbulence, is insigniﬁcant on impact and even falls
some months after the identiﬁed unconventional shocks.
In sum, we can safely conclude that the Eurosystem can inﬂuence economic activity and
inﬂation beyond the policy rate by adjusting the size of its balance sheet or the monetary
base. This conclusion is further conﬁrmed by the estimation of an extended VAR model
in the appendix of this paper that explicitly distinguishes between unconventional policy
measures that aﬀect the money market term spread and exogenous shocks to the size of
the balance sheet.
3.4 Monetary Transmission Mechanism
So far, we have seen that the impact of quantitative easing policies on output and consumer
prices is more delayed compared to a decline in the policy rate. Is there a diﬀerence in the
transmission mechanism of both instruments? To learn more about this, panel A of Figure
5 shows the impact of the two policy shocks on the credit multiplier and the interest rate
17Due to space constraints, I only show the impulse response function of the additional variable to both
monetary policy shocks. Full results are available upon request.
16spread for the baseline VAR. The response of the multiplier is obtained from the responses
of credit and the monetary base for each posterior draw, while the interest rate spread
is proxied by the diﬀerence between the response of the bank lending rate and the MRO
rate, as we may expect that the policy rate is pivotal in setting bank’s funding conditions.
Consider an increase in the monetary base due to an unconventional policy action.
The injection of liquidity results in a rise of credit supplied by banks, reducing lending
rates and hence also the interest rate spread charged by banks. The fall in the interest rate
spread is implicitly imposed for the ﬁrst month, but seems to persist for more than two
years. The credit multiplier declines signiﬁcantly in the short run and gradually returns
to its initial level after about one year. Hence, the rise in the monetary base is only
proportionally transmitted to the volume of bank lending in the long run. In contrast, in
case of a policy easing, a traditional innovation to the policy rate results in a signiﬁcant
rise of the interest rate spread charged by banks. More precisely, the interest rate decline
of the ECB is passed on to bank lending rates, but less than proportional. The fall in bank
lending rates and rise of interest rate spreads boost credit demand and supply, resulting
in a relative quick pass-through to economic activity and inﬂa t i o n( a ss h o w ni nF i g u r e1
and discussed in section 3.1). In addition, there is hardly a change in the credit multiplier,
nor a signiﬁcant liquidity eﬀect in the short-run.
The diﬀerent response of the credit multiplier after both monetary policy shocks is
particularly interesting. A potential explanation is the popular risk-taking channel of
monetary transmission. Notice ﬁrst that, according to traditional textbooks (e.g. Mishkin
2010; Walsh 2010), expansionary monetary policy is expected to have a downward impact
on the credit multiplier. Speciﬁcally, when interest rates fall, households typically hold
more currency relative to interest-bearing bank deposits. As a consequence, less liquidity
returns to the ﬁnancial sector, reducing the ability to supply loans and hence also the
credit multiplier. Similarly, a lower interest rate reduces the opportunity cost for banks
to hold excess reserves and vault cash, which also lowers the credit multiplier. On the
other hand, monetary policy is expected to inﬂuence the lending capacity of banks and
the credit multiplier via at least two other eﬀects that are part of the risk-taking channel of
monetary transmission (Borio and Zhu 2008; Adrian and Shin 2010). First, expansionary
monetary policy increases the quality and value of outstanding bank loans through an
increase in collateral and the expected associated repayment ﬂows. Accordingly, the value
of bank’s marked-to-market equity rises leading to an increased balance sheet capacity
and risk appetite of the banking system, resulting in greater loan supply. In particular,
ﬁnancial intermediaries will attempt to ﬁnd ways to allocate their surplus capital. On
17the liability side, they take on more debt. On the assets side, they search for borrowers,
which expands the credit multiplier. Second, the proﬁtability and risk-taking capacity of
ﬁnancial intermediaries is more directly aﬀected by bank’s interest rate spreads. When
interest rate spreads rise, the marked-to-market value of equity also increases, leading to
more risk appetite of banks and a shift in the supply of credit. Likely, this risk-taking
channel of monetary transmission is much stronger for an interest rate shock compared
to an innovation in the balance sheet of the central bank. On the one hand, the value of
collateral is probably more aﬀected when also the level of the risk-free rate changes. More
crucially, the interest rate spread increases signiﬁcantly after a conventional interest rate
fall, whereas there is a signiﬁcant decline following non-standard policy disturbances (see
Figure 5). This channel could hence be a possible source of the substantial diﬀerence in
the estimated response of the credit multiplier after both monetary policy shocks. Put
diﬀerently, the same volume of loans is generated by the ﬁnancial sector for roughly a 0.5
percent increase in the monetary base which also shifts the policy rate, as for a 2 percent
rise of the monetary base without an accompanying shift in the policy rate.
Strikingly, as shown in panel B of Figure 5, there seems not even to be a liquidity eﬀect
for bank reserves after an interest rate innovation.18 Such a liquidity eﬀect is often used in
the literature to identify monetary policy shocks with sign restrictions (e.g. Uhlig 2005 or
Canova and De Nicoló 2002). In particular, these studies identify a monetary policy shock
as a disturbance that moves the policy rate and bank reserves in the opposite direction.
However, bank reserves turn out to decline in the short run, while the corresponding
multiplier increases signiﬁcantly after a fall in the policy rate. In other words, all additional
credit is generated by the banking sector via a rising multiplier.
4 Conclusions
In this paper, I have examined the macroeconomic eﬀects of traditional interest rate in-
novations and unconventional monetary policy actions on the Euro area economy. More
precisely, I have used a structural VAR model to identify three diﬀerent types of distur-
bances at the supply side of the credit market: (i) innovations to the supply of credit by
banks independently of a monetary policy action, (ii) shocks to the supply of credit due to
a shift in the policy rate and (iii) credit supply shocks caused by non-standard monetary
policy actions that are orthogonal to the policy rate.
18An overview of the early literature on the existence of a liquidity eﬀect can be found in Pagan and
Robertson (1995).
18I ﬁnd that more than one instrument can be used to inﬂuence the economy. In par-
ticular, a policy action which raises the monetary base or the size of the central bank
balance sheet for a given policy rate, has a hump-shaped eﬀect on economic activity and a
permanent impact on consumer prices. Compared to a traditional interest rate innovation,
the pass-through is more sluggish. In addition, the transmission mechanism of both types
of policy instruments turns out to be diﬀerent. Whereas a rise in the balance sheet of the
Eurosystem is passed on to bank lending via a decline in interest rate spreads of banks,
the spreads increase signiﬁcantly after a fall in the policy rate. Furthermore, the so-called
credit multiplier declines considerably after a balance sheet shock. In contrast, the surge
in the volume of credit after an interest rate innovation is mainly created by a rising mul-
tiplier. A potential explanation for the diﬀerence is a stronger risk-taking channel for an
interest rate innovation, a feature which deserves more attention in future research.
The impact and pass-through of the identiﬁed unconventional policy shocks should
help to learn more about the extraordinary policy measures taken by central banks as a
response to the ﬁnancial turmoil. Some caution is, however, required. A caveat of the
analysis is that the estimations are based on a sample period that covers the turbulent
period on ﬁn a n c i a lm a r k e t s ,a sw e l la sn o r m a lt i m e s . An implicit assumption is hence that
the parameters did not change dramatically as a consequence of the crisis. In addition, the
analysis only captures unconventional monetary policy to the extent that the measures
inﬂuence the banking sector. Hence, a useful extension would be to also include direct
lending of central banks in private markets in the analysis.
19A Appendix - Two types of unconventional policy shocks
In the paper, I have shown that exogenous shifts in the volume of central bank liquidity
are the dominant driving force of the identiﬁed non-standard monetary policy shocks in
the baseline VAR and have signiﬁcant output and inﬂationary eﬀects beyond the current
and expected monetary policy rate or the composition of the central bank balance sheet.
However, whilst the immediate impact of the disturbances on the money market term
spread is insigniﬁcant, the distribution of this impact turns out to be negatively skewed
(see Figure 4). This suggest that several draws are characterized by a noticeable decline of
the spread on impact. In this appendix, I have therefore also estimated an extended VAR
model with two diﬀerent types of unconventional monetary policy shocks. More precisely,
compared to the baseline model, the spread between the 12-month and 1-month Euribor is
added to the block of credit market variables in the VAR and I now simultaneously identify
four possible shocks at the supply side of the credit market. Credit supply shocks driven
by disturbances to the credit multiplier and by traditional interest rate innovations are
still identiﬁed in the same way as in the baseline model. As a ﬁrst possible unconventional
policy shock, I consider a credit supply shock which is characterized by a decline in the
money market term spread that is orthogonal to the policy rate. I label this disturbance
as a "signaling" shock, which could for instance be the consequence of lending at longer
maturities by the ECB or a change in the communication about the future stance of
monetary policy. The second non-standard policy shock that could lead to a shift in
the supply of credit, labeled as a "balance sheet" shock, is identiﬁed as a disturbance
to the supply of credit caused by a shock in the volume of central bank money that is
orthogonal to both the policy rate and the money market term spread. All restrictions
can be summarized as follows:
Identiﬁcation of two types of non-standard monetary policy shocks
yt pt ct it st bt spt ct − bt
Credit multiplier shocks 00↑lagged ↓↑ ↑
Interest rate innovations 00↑lagged ↓↓
Signaling shocks 00↑lagged ↓ 0 ↓
Balance sheet shocks 00↑lagged ↓ 0 ↑ 0
Note: yt = output, pt = prices, ct =c r e d i t ,it = lending rate, st = policy rate, bt = monetary base
spt = spread between 12 month and 1 month Euribor
The impulse responses to the three diﬀerent types of policy disturbances are shown
20in Figure A1.19 As expected, the dynamic eﬀects of the balance sheet shocks are very
comparable to the unconventional disturbances identiﬁed in the baseline VAR. There is
still a hump-shaped impact on economic activity which is more sluggish than the response
to an interest rate innovation. Notice that also a credit supply shock which is caused by
a decline in the money market term spread that is orthogonal to the policy rate tends
to be followed by a temporary increase in economic activity and a more permanent eﬀect
on the level of consumer prices. The dynamics are strikingly similar as for a traditional
interest rate innovation. Interestingly, the monetary base does not react and the policy
rate eﬀectively declines after a few months.
The decline of the credit multiplier and persistent fall in the interest rate spread after
a shock in the balance sheet of the Eurosystem is also conﬁrmed by the VAR model with
two types of unconventional policy shocks. In contrast, the transmission mechanism for
innovations that reduce the money market term spread, in particular the response of the
monetary base and the credit multiplier, appears to be very similar as for a conventional
interest rate shock. Notice that whereas the spread between the policy rate and the bank
lending interest rate remains more or less constant after the signaling shock, the interest
margin and proﬁtability of banks should improve due to the decline of longer term money
market interest rates. Hence, also the risk-taking eﬀect is probably strong.
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23Figure 1 - Impulse responses to different types of credit supply shocks
Panel A: Interest rate innovations and non-standard policy actions
Note:      Interest rate innovations: 68 percent probability regions
     Non-standard policy actions: 68 percent probability regions
Panel B: Credit multiplier shocks
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0 12 24 36Figure 2 - Time series of shocks
Panel A: Monetary base components, unconventional shocks and credit multiplier shocks
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Monetary policy rate Interest rate innovations (cumulative)Figure 3 - Interest rate innovations versus non-standard policy actions: sensitivity analysis
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0 12 24 36Figure 4 - Inspecting the source of unconventional monetary policy shocks
Panel A: VAR with EONIA as the policy rate
Note:      Interest rate innovations
     Non-standard policy actions
Panel B: Impulse responses of other variables
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0 12 24 36Figure 5 - Transmission mechanism of conventional and unconventional monetary policy
Panel A: Baseline specification
Note:      Interest rate innovations
     Non-standard policy actions
Panel B: Bank reserves as central bank money
Note:      Interest rate innovations
     Non-standard policy actions
Monetary base Credit multiplier Interest rate spread


























































0 12 24 36Figure A1 - A VAR with two types of unconventional monetary policy shocks
 Interest rate innovations
 Central bank balance sheet disturbances
 Policy signaling shocks
Credit multiplier
Interest rate spread
Output Prices Monetary base















































































































0 12 24 36